Essential Plenitude

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1 Material Plenitude



Material Plenitude. Each material object coincides with numerous other objects that vary only with respect to the essential and accidental properties they possess, where essences and accidents are understood in the purely modal sense.

Modal Profile

A modal profile $\mathcal{R}$ of an object x consists of a base $\mathcal{B}_\mathcal{R}$, which is a set of properties, and a function $f_\mathcal{R} : \mathcal{B}_\mathcal{R} \mapsto \{E, A\}$ from the base to the set $\{E, A\}$ of subsets of $\mathcal{B}_\mathcal{R}$, where E is the set of x's essential properties and A is the set of x's accidental properties. For every property P, if $P \in \mathcal{B}_\mathcal{R}$ and $f_\mathcal{R}(P) \in E$, then x is *essentially* P.

The Modal Account of Essence (ME)

x is essentially P iff necessarily, if x exists, x is P.

x is accidentally P iff x is P but possibly, x exists and is not P.

Naive Plenitude. For any material object x and profile $\mathcal{R}$ based on all x's properties, there is something coincident with x that has profile $\mathcal{R}$.

	E	**A**
a	F	G
b		G
c	F	
d	G	F
e	G	
h		F
i	F, G	
k		F, G

The Impossible Monster Problem

Let F be *the property of being* a. Indubitably, F is an essential property in a's profile. Thus, there would be a coinciding object, c, such that c has F as a property. But, a should be the only thing having *the property of being* a.

The Inconsistency Problem

Let F be *being blue* and G be *being colored*. Then, there is a coincident object c where c is blue but is not colored. But, nothing could be blue without being colored.

2 Essential Plenitude

For each class of objects, be they concepts or individuals or entities of some other kind, will give rise to its own domain of necessary truths, the truths which flow from the nature of the objects in question. The metaphysically necessary truths can then be identified with the propositions which are true in virtue of the nature of all objects whatever. (Fine, 1994, p. 9)

The Finean Account of Essence

x is essentially$_f$ P iff 'x is P' is true in virtue of x's identity.

x is accidentally$_f$ P iff 'x is P' is true but not in virtue of x's identity.

Non-trivial Essential$_f$ Properties	*Trivial Essential$_f$ Properties*
The property of being human.	The property of being self-identical.
The property of having 2 as a sole member.	The property of being P or not P.

Consequential versus Constitutive Essence

The essence of an object x is made up of the set of propositions true in virtue of x's identity, where propositions can have constituents (Fine, 1995, p. 276).

A proposition is a member of x's constitutive essence if it is a member of its essence but does not logically follow from some more basic members of the constitutive essence.

A proposition is a member of x's consequential essence if it logically follows from members of the constitutive essence.

Generalizing out for propositions. A proposition can be generalized out of a set X if X contains the generalization $\phi(v)$ of a proposition $\phi(y)$, whenever it contains the proposition $\phi(y)$.

- The generalization of a proposition, $\phi(y)$, is the proposition that $\phi(v)$ holds for all objects, v (e.g., 'Socrates = Socrates' and '$\forall v(v = v)$').
- Consider the union set S of Socrates's constitutive and consequential essence and consider the proposition that Socrates = Socrates.
- 'Socrates = Socrates' is a logical truth and so enters Socrates's consequential essence and S.
- The generalization of the proposition that Socrates = Socrates, '$\forall v(v = v)$', is in S since it is also a logical truth.
- Then, the proposition that Socrates = Socrates can be generalized out from S.

Non-trivial Essential$_f$ Properties

The non-trivial essential$_f$ properties cannot be generalized out from X, where X is the union set of x's constitutive and consequential essence (Roca-Royes, 2011).

Trivial Essential$_f$ Properties

Trivial essential$_f$ properties can be generalized out from X.

Essential Profile

An essential profile $\mathcal{R}*$ of an object x consists of a base $\mathcal{B}_{\mathcal{R}*}$, which is a set of properties, and a function $f_{\mathcal{R}} : \mathcal{B}_{\mathcal{R}} \mapsto \{\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{A}\}$ from the base to the set $\{\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{A}\}$ of subsets of $\mathcal{B}_{\mathcal{R}*}$, where $\mathcal{E}$ is the set of x's non-trivial essential$_f$ properties and $\mathcal{A}$ is the set of x's accidental$_f$ properties.

Essential Plenitude. For any material object x and profile $\mathcal{R}*$ based on all x's properties, there is something coincident with x that has profile $\mathcal{R}*$.

- Let a be Socrates and have only the properties of being Socrates (N), being dark-haired (G), and being human (F).

	$\mathcal{E}$	$\mathcal{A}$
b	F	G
c		G
d	F	
e	G	F
h	G	
i		F
k	F, G	
l		F, G

The Impossible Monster Problem

Let F be *the property of being* a. Indubitably, F is an essential property in a's profile. Thus, there would be a coinciding object, c, such that c has F as a property. But, a should be the only thing having *the property of being* a.

Solution: The Impossible Monster Problem

Consider *the property of being Socrates*, which is essential$_f$ to Socrates. However, 'Socrates is Socrates' is a trivial essential proposition since it can be generalized out. Hence, *the property of being Socrates* will also not be a member of $\mathcal{E}$.

Necessary and Essential$_f$ Properties	*Necessary and Accidental$_f$ Properties*
The property of being human.	The property of being able to smile.
The property of being self-identical.	The property of being able to read.

The Inconsistency Problem

Let F be *being blue* and G be *being colored*. Then, there is a coincident object d where d is blue but is not colored. But, nothing could be blue without being colored.

	$\mathcal{E}$	$\mathcal{A}$
b	F	G
c		G
d	F	
e	G	F
h	G	
i		F
k	F, G	
l		F, G

Solution: The Inconsistency Problem

If one tolerates that objects possess properties such as *being blue* in virtue of their identity, the marble, d, can be essentially$_f$ blue and necessarily colored. That is, it is true in virtue of d's identity that d is blue, but d is necessarily colored.

Reference

Fine, Kit (1994). "Essence and Modality". In: *Philosophical Perspectives* 8.Logic and Language, pp. 1–16.

– (1995). "XIV—Ontological Dependence". In: *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 95.1, pp. 269–290.

Roca-Royes, Sonia (2011). "Essential Properties and Individual Essences". In: *Philosophy Compass* 6.1, pp. 65–77.